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Abstract 
Past research has found that environmental primes can automatically initiate unconscious goal 
striving.  Recent models of priming have suggested that this effect might be moderated by 
validation processes. According to a goal validation perspective, primes should cause changes in 
one’s motivational state to the extent people have confidence in the prime-related mental content.  
Across three experiments we provided the first direct empirical evidence for this goal validation 
account.  Using a variety of goal priming manipulations (cooperation versus competition, 
achievement, and self-improvement versus saving money) and validity inductions (power, ease, 
and writing about confidence), we demonstrated that the impact of goal primes on behavior 
occurs to a greater extent when conditions foster confidence (versus doubt) in mental contents.  
Indeed, when conditions foster doubt, goal priming effects are eliminated or counter to the 
implications of the prime.  The implications of these findings for research on goal priming and 
validation processes are discussed. 
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From primed construct to motivated behavior: Validation processes in goal pursuit  
The study of self-regulation and goal pursuit is a fundamental topic in psychology (Vohs 
& Baumeister, 2011) with widespread implications for human thought and behavior.  At a 
cognitive level, goals are abstract structures in memory that can become accessible through 
contextual cues and guide behavior toward the attainment of desired end states (Fishbach & 
Ferguson, 2007).  Although historically thought to be relatively deliberative in nature (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990), contemporary research indicates that goals can 
be both activated and pursued outside of conscious awareness. For example, Chartrand and 
Bargh (1996) demonstrated simple priming manipulations, such as those previously used to 
activate traits or stereotypes (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979), can also produce complex, motivated 
behavior.  These priming manipulations have produced motivated behavior for goals as diverse 
as achievement (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001), seeking casual sex 
(Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004), forming impressions of others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), 
dieting (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003), and knowledge seeking (Riketta & 
Dauenheimer, 2003).   
Once activated, primed goals operate in the same manner as consciously selected ones.  
That is, goal priming produces all of the hallmarks of conscious goal pursuit including increases 
in goal strength over time, persistence in the face of obstacles, and  resumption after interruption 
(Bargh et al., 2001; see also, Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007).  In addition, success and 
failure at nonconscious goals produces emotional responses parallel to those experienced with 
success and failure at conscious goals (Chartrand, Cheng, Dalton, & Tesser, 2010; Loersch, 
Aarts, Payne, & Jefferis, 2008; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003).   
The Goal Validation Perspective 
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 In efforts to explain a wide range of automatically enacted behavior, several recent papers 
have provided integrative accounts for when and how activated concepts will influence behavior 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts, 2007).  A common theme across a number of frameworks 
is that primed mental contents, such as goals, will only direct behavior to the extent that they are 
seen as a valid (e.g., correct, appropriate) basis for judgment and behavior (see Briñol & Petty, 
2009; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009; Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). 
Drawing on research from attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), social judgment 
(Kruglanski, 1990), and persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2009), these models propose that a primed 
concept can often act as information that people use to directly (Loersch & Payne, 2011; 
Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009) or indirectly (Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009) infer their current 
motives.  Critically, it is only to the extent that this prime-related information is perceived as 
valid (i.e., held with confidence) that it is utilized in guiding goal adoption and pursuit.  For 
example, an individual primed with the goal of helping others will only adopt and pursue this 
goal if the content activated by the prime is associated with confidence. If the same content were 
instead associated with doubt, it would no longer be perceived as an appropriate option for 
behavior. Because of this process, any variable that affects the confidence in one’s current 
mental contents should moderate the influence of an activated goal.  
Although other research has identified moderators of goal priming such as the value 
(sometimes also called evaluation or reward cue) of the activated goal (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 
2005) and reactance motives (Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007), the goal validation 
perspective suggests that the moderators of goal priming can be extended even further to include 
a wider set of variables. In particular, this perspective argues that any variable that increases or 
decreases confidence should similarly be able to increase or decrease the impact of goal priming.  
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Here, we provide the first direct test of the goal validation hypothesis by demonstrating that 
manipulating variables known to affect thought confidence (i.e., power, ease, and episodic recall 
of confidence) can indeed moderate the impact of goal primes on participants’ actions.  
The Current Research  
In this research we postulate that the extent to which prime-related mental contents are 
viewed as valid can determine whether a primed concept influences motivated behavior. Using 
manipulations that have been previously shown to influence confidence of non-goal related 
mental contents (see Briñol & Petty, 2009), we manipulated participants’ sense of power 
(Experiment 1), the ease with which a person recalls goal-relevant behavior (Experiment 2), and 
an episodic recall of one’s own past experiences of confidence versus doubt (Experiment 3) to 
determine whether these variables affect the degree of goal striving that results from a priming 
manipulation.  We examined a variety of goals, including competition versus cooperation, 
achievement, and self-improvement versus saving money.  We use both sequential (Experiments 
1 and 3) and simultaneous (Experiment 2) manipulations of goal priming and confidence. The 
sequential manipulations were ordered such that the manipulation of goal priming preceded the 
manipulation of confidence.  In a sequential paradigm, manipulating confidence following the 
prime provides the strongest test of our hypotheses because it ensures that the activation by the 
goal primes is not influenced by validity perceptions.  This allows us to examine the impact of 
the validation manipulations while ensuring equivalent construct activation across conditions.  In 
addition, this timing increases the odds that the primed mental contents will be perceived to be 
the source of any confidence or doubt, as they are highly accessible at the time participants 
experience confidence or doubt.   
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Because confidence (induced via writing about it or stemming from variables such as 
power and ease) has been shown to validate activated mental contents, we expected the primes to 
have a significant effect on goal-relevant behavior under high confidence conditions.  The same 
primes should not, however, produce motivated behavior if conditions instead foster perceptions 
of doubt and invalidity, and might even lead to contrast from goal primes. In addition to 
providing the first direct empirical support for the hypothesized role of validation processes in 
goal pursuit (e.g., Loersch & Payne, 2011; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009; Wheeler et al., 2007), 
these experiments will add to the current literatures on both goals and metacognition by showing 
that goal pursuit is amenable to a thought-validation analysis (e.g., Petty et al., 2002).   
Experiment 1 
Past research has demonstrated that high (versus low) power is associated with 
confidence (versus doubt) and therefore can validate what people have in their minds (Briñol, 
Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007; See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011).  In Experiment 
1, we primed participants with the goal to cooperate or compete and then had them reflect on 
times when they had held high or low levels of power. We manipulated power after goal priming 
to ensure that participants would have equivalent construct accessibility which could then be 
validated or invalidated by feelings of high or low power. After inducing high or low power, we 
examined the impact of the primes on people’s simulated behavior in two economic decision 
making tasks.  If validity processes can influence goal adoption and pursuit, then more goal-
congruent behavior should occur among individuals made to feel powerful than powerless. 
Indeed, low power conditions should attenuate or even reverse the impact of primes on behavior. 
Method 
Participants were primed with the construct of competition or cooperation using a word 
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completion task.  They were then induced to feel powerful or powerless using an episodic recall 
task.  Participants then engaged in a pair of simulated economic decision making tasks which 
offered them the opportunity to cooperate with a hypothetical partner.  Finally, participants were 
probed for suspicion (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and then fully debriefed.   
Participants.  Participants were 92 undergraduates at Ohio State University who 
received partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement for their 
participation.  Participants were seated in a room with visually-isolated cubicles.  Prior to 
beginning the study, we obtained informed consent and ensured participants of the anonymity 
and confidentiality of their responses.  The experiment was a 2 (Goal Prime: competition vs. 
cooperation) X 2 (Power: high vs. low) between subjects design, with random assignment to 
conditions (n = 23 in each condition).  
Materials  
Goal Prime.  For the goal priming manipulation, participants were asked to engage in a 
word-completion task, ostensibly as a test of language processes. Participants were asked to 
determine what word could be created by filling in the 1-2 missing letters for each trial (e.g., 
_hoes, v_cuu_).  The ten prime words included in this task were associated with pursuing either 
competitive / pro-self (compete, victory, battle, strive, succeed, loser, best, worst, pedestal, 
executive) or cooperative / pro-social goals (cooperate, together, assist, help, support, mutual, 
team, reciprocal, share, collective), whereas the 22 filler words were unrelated to either prime 
(e.g., bridge, shoes, vacuum, recliner).  Similar tasks have been used successfully to prime other 
constructs (e.g., Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000; Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 
2008).  The prime words were similar to those used in other research that has primed competition 
or cooperation goals (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001).  Prime and filler words were presented in a 
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random order for each participant. 
Power.  Immediately following the priming induction, participants were made to feel 
powerful or powerless through a brief essay task (from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003, 
Experiment 2), ostensibly a pretest measure for the development of a life-events inventory.  
Participants in the high power condition were asked to describe two experiences in which they 
held power over another person or persons (i.e., had control over their outcomes or evaluations), 
including the details of the situation, how they felt, and so forth.  Participants in the low power 
condition were asked to write about two experiences where someone else held power over them. 
Previous research using this manipulation has shown that it can increase confidence (Briñol et 
al., 2007, Study 4). 
Economic games. Following the power induction, participants were asked to take part in 
two economic decision making tasks, ostensibly so we could develop norms for the different 
procedures.  Participants were told to imagine they were playing with a real partner for actual 
money.  The first task was a Dictator Game (e.g., Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998), a commonly 
used measure of altruistic or prosocial motivation. In the Dictator Game, participants were told to 
imagine that they would be given ten dollars ($10) and that they could divide this money with 
another person if they chose.  Any money they did not give to their partner was theirs to keep.  
This was followed by a Trust Game (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), a commonly used 
measure of trust or cooperative motives.  In the Trust Game, participants were told to imagine 
playing with a partner with a new $10.  In the Trust Game, participants were told that any money 
sent to their partner was tripled in value and that once their partner had received the money, the 
partner would have an opportunity to return some portion of their earnings to them.  Higher 
values on both tasks thus represent more prosocial/cooperative motivation.   
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Results  
Although the two measures were uncorrelated (r = .07), participants’ responses to both 
tasks revealed parallel results.  As such, the dependent measure reported is the average amount 
of money participants sent to their partner across the two tasks (out of $10).1  This dollar value 
was submitted to a Goal Prime (competition vs. cooperation) x Power (high vs. low) ANOVA 
(MSE = 236.59).  The only significant effect was the predicted Prime x Power interaction, 
F(1,88) = 6.96, p = .01, ηp² = .07 (see Figure 1).  Decomposition of this interaction indicated that 
there was a main effect of the prime when people were made to feel powerful F(1,88) = 4.66, p = 
.03, ηp² = .05, such that people in the cooperation condition (M = $6.07, SD = $1.89) allocated 
significantly more to their partner than people in the competition condition (M = $5.02, SD = 
$1.41).  In the low power condition, no significant effect of prime emerged, F(1,88) = 2.48, p = 
.12, ηp² = .025, although the tendency was for a contrast effect to emerge, with cooperation-
primed participants behaving less cooperatively (M = $4.85, SD = $1.73) than competition-
primed participants (M = $5.61, SD = $1.48). 
Discussion 
Consistent with the goal validation perspective, only participants for whom the goal 
primes were followed by a validity cue in the form of high power displayed prime-congruent 
behavior.  The same primes had no effect for participants who instead were required to think 
about low power. In fact, for the latter group, the goal priming effect tended to be reversed. A 
reversal would be likely to the extent that low power produced so much doubt that participants 
wanted to do the opposite of their thoughts.  This is consistent with past research on validation 
processes in persuasion showing that doubt can sometimes lead to such overcompensation 
(contrast) effects (e.g., Briñol, Petty, Barden, 2007), an outcome that is more likely when the 
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activated construct is dichotomous in nature (e.g., compete vs. cooperate) rather than continuous 
(e.g., degree of competitive behavior; Briñol, Gandarillas, & Petty, 2011; see, Briñol, DeMarree, 
& Petty, 2010; for a discussion).  
In addition to providing the first direct support for our goal validation perspective, these 
results also contribute to the general literature on goal pursuit by demonstrating that power can 
also moderate the relationship between primed goals and behavior. Prior to these findings, only 
goal value (e.g., affect; see Aarts et al., 2007; Custers & Aarts, 2005) and reactance motives 
(Chartrand et al., 2007) have been shown to moderate goal priming effects. The findings are also 
informative for the study of power because they show that power can alternatively lead to both 
positive and negative behavior depending on the current situation.  Here, we saw power produce 
both pro-social behavior (e.g., cooperating with others) and anti-social behavior (e.g., sharing 
less resources with others) depending on the power holder’s currently accessible goal (for further 
discussion, see also Rucker, Galinsky, & Dubois, in press).   
Although these results are promising, one could argue that this study is not uniquely 
supportive of our hypotheses.  Past research has demonstrated a direct link between the 
experience of power and confidence (Briñol, Petty, Valle, et al., 2007; See et al., 2011), but other 
mechanisms for the action of power are possible.  For example, Guinote and colleagues postulate 
that power is associated with greater accessibility of and attention to self-relevant goals (e.g., 
Guinote, 2007; Slabu & Guinote, 2010). Importantly, because power followed (rather than 
preceded) goal priming in our study, it is less likely that differences in goal activation could 
underlie the effects. Also, Keltner and colleagues argue that power is associated with an 
approach orientation (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), which might increase the adoption 
of a primed goal in a similar manner to confidence.  In order to address this issue, Experiment 2 
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utilized an established source of confidence that is not associated with approach – the sense of 
ease (Schwarz et al, 1991; Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002).  
In addition, although we are interested in the effects of primed goals, the behavior 
measured in Experiment 1 is not completely unique to goal pursuit.  That is, although our results 
are consistent with a goal priming effect (Loersch et al., 2008), they could also be caused by the 
direct influence of a prime on behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Loersch & Payne, 
2012), or the indirect influence of primes on behavior through shifts in self-perceptions 
(DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005), situational perceptions (Kay & Ross, 2003), or perceptions 
of participants’ ostensible interaction partner (Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2009; for reviews, see 
Loersch & Payne, 2011; Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2010; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009).2  
Because several researchers have argued that goal activation differs from the activation of other 
constructs (Bargh et al., 2001; Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007), in Experiment 2 we 
shifted our dependent measure to examine a unique consequence of goal pursuit: effort 
expenditure in the face of failure (Bargh et al., 2001).  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to conceptually replicate the findings of Experiment 1 using a 
new prime, validity cue, and dependent measure.  In addition, we examined a goal-relevant 
outcome and measured additional control variables.  In Experiment 2, we primed all participants 
with an achievement goal during a recall task.  To associate the primed content with a validity 
cue, we manipulated the experienced ease of recall (Schwarz et al., 1991). Past research has 
demonstrated that ease (versus difficulty) of thought retrieval increases confidence in the recalled 
content (Tormala et al., 2002; for a review see Briñol, Tormala, & Petty, in press).  We then 
examined the impact of goal priming on participants’ persistence in the face of failure.   
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If validity perceptions affect goal adoption and pursuit, then we should see more goal-
striving among people who associated the recalled content with the sense of ease (versus 
difficulty).  Thus, we hypothesize that participants should be more inclined to rely on the primed 
goal in a subsequent test when the accessible construct is associated with confidence (from the 
easy recall task) than when associated with doubt (from the difficult recall task). Furthermore, 
because past research has shown that affective states (which can convey the value of the 
activated goal; Custers & Aarts, 2005; Huntsinger & Clore, 2012) can moderate the impact of 
activated goals on behavior, we measured participants’ mood to determine whether it was 
influenced by our ease manipulation. If the manipulation of ease affects validity independent of 
mood, this measure should be unaffected by the manipulation and any effects of ease should hold 
when controlling for mood.  In addition, because primes can affect self-perceptions (DeMarree et 
al., 2005) and because the ease-of-retrieval paradigm has been used to influence self-perceptions 
(Schwarz et al., 1991), we also measured self-perceptions relating to achievement.  If we are 
truly examining non-conscious goal pursuit, then any effects we observe should be independent 
of explicit self-reports of achievement orientation. 
Method 
In order to test our hypothesis, participants were randomly assigned to a single factor 
(number of examples recalled:  four vs. ten) between-subjects design.  An achievement goal was 
primed by having participants recall past instances of achievement striving.  The number of 
examples recalled served as a manipulation of participants’ subjective ease of retrieval (Schwarz 
et al., 1991).  Based on pilot testing among the same population as our primary experiment, 
recalling four examples was expected to feel relatively easy and recalling ten was expected to 
feel relatively difficult.  After completing the recall task, all participants completed a series of 
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very difficult anagram items and were then given a chance to raise their score on the anagram 
task by completing additional, easy, items.  The amount of time spent on the second anagram 
task served as our measure of achievement striving.  Following this, participants completed a 
mood assessment, rated the subjective ease of the recall task and their achievement orientation, 
and completed a funnel-debriefing procedure.   
Participants. Participants were 64 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses at Ohio State University.  Preliminary data analysis found one outlier (greater than 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean) on our primary dependent measure.  This participant was 
excluded from subsequent analyses, leaving 63 individuals in the final data set. Inclusion of this 
participant did not alter the significance level of the findings reported below. 
Materials. 
Achievement striving recall task.  Participants began the study by completing the 
achievement priming task, modeled after other research examining ease-of-retrieval (Schwarz et 
al., 1991).  In the ‘easy’ condition of the experiment, participants were required to recall (and 
summarize in one or two short sentences) four times in which they had tried very hard to achieve 
at some task.  In the ‘difficult’ condition, participants instead recalled ten instances of past 
achievement striving.  Participants were not forewarned about the number of instances to be 
recalled.  Depending on condition, the task simply ended after participants had completed either 
four or ten recall screens.   
 Anagram tasks.  After completing the priming task, participants were provided with an 
opportunity to pursue an achievement goal during a two-part anagram task.  On each item of this 
task, participants were asked to rearrange a series of letters into a proper English word.  If, for 
instance, a participant was given the letters w e t r a, a correct solution would be water.  Framed 
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as a measure of basic language skill, the first part of the anagram task was constructed so as to 
provide all participants with the impression that they had failed to achieve, with a score 
indicative of low skill level.  In order to do this, the measure consisted of three items, the first of 
which was very easy (a z z i p) followed by two anagrams which were constructed so as to be 
virtually impossible for participants to successfully solve.  The first was c s r a p o t.  The second 
was relation, which participants were asked to rearrange into a different word.  As expected, all 
participants but one correctly solved the easy anagram and none were able to successfully 
complete the two very difficult items.  
After seeing the correct answers to these three items, participants were introduced to a 
second anagram task which served as our measure of achievement motivation.  On this second 
task, participants were informed that they could spend as much time as they liked completing an 
easier set of anagram items to raise their score from the previous task.  After each individual item 
in this part of the task, they were asked to choose one of the following options 1) “I would like 
another chance to raise my score.” or 2) “I am satisfied with my score.”  Those who selected the 
first option received another anagram while those who selected the second moved on to the next 
task of the experiment.  After receiving the instructions for this second anagram task, all 
participants were given a relatively easy item (f o o b a l t l) followed by the choice options 
above.  The task ended without warning after 20 total items.  The amount of time each 
participant spent attempting to raise his or her score was recorded and served as our measure of 
achievement striving (for a similar measure, see McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984).   
Affect measure.  In order to examine whether our validity manipulation influenced 
participants’ mood, we administered the affect subscale of the Affect Arousal Scale (Salovey & 
Birnbaum, 1989) after participants had completed the anagram task.  This measure consists of 
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three bipolar, seven-point scales (ranging from -3 to +3) anchored with the labels very sad/ very 
happy, very depressed/ very elated, and very dissatisfied/ very satisfied.  
Subjective ease of recall.  To check that our manipulation affected the perceived ease of 
recall as expected, participants were next asked: “How difficult/easy was it for you to recall the 
examples of times you were highly motivated to achieve?” This item was rated on a seven-point 
scale ranging from -3 (Extremely Difficult) to 3 (Extremely Easy).   
Achievement orientation.  In order to determine whether our manipulation produced 
conscious changes in self-perceptions (see Schwarz et al., 1991) rather than non-conscious goal 
activation as intended, we also included a single item designed to assess self-perceived 
achievement orientation.  This item was completed after the ease of recall rating, and was 
worded “To what extent do you view yourself as someone who tries hard to achieve?”  
Participants completed this item on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 6 (A lot).   
Results 
Manipulation check. As expected, the manipulation affected the subjective ease of the 
recall task.  Participants who recalled four examples found the task significantly easier (M = .91, 
SD = 1.35) than those who recalled ten (M = -.13, SD = 1.62), t(62) = 2.76, p = .01, d = .70.  
Goal striving.  As predicted, the ease manipulation had the predicted effect on the 
amount of time participants spent attempting to raise their score during the second anagram task, 
t(62) = 2.08, p = .04, d = .53.  Participants who had recalled only four examples of past 
achievement striving exerted more effort (as indicated by time working on task) attempting to 
raise their score (M = 75.2 s, SD = 57.7 s) than those who had recalled ten examples (M = 47.3 s, 
SD = 49.3 s).  Because participants in the two experimental conditions necessarily spent very 
different amounts of time recalling examples of achievement striving prior to the dependent 
GOAL VALIDATION  16 
 
measure, we also ran an ANCOVA analysis that controlled for the amount of time spent on the 
recall task (MSE = 2920.41).  The effect of our manipulation remained marginally significant 
when this variable was used as a covariate, F(1,61) = 3.36, p = .07, ηp² = .05. 
Mood. In addition, we examined the effect of our manipulation on participants’ mood.  It 
was not affected, t < 1.  We then ran an ANCOVA analysis which examined the effect of the 
ease manipulation on goal striving while controlling for participants’ affect (MSE = 2926.71).  
Mood was not a significant predictor of the time spent on the second anagram task, F < 1, and 
the effect of the manipulation remained significant, F(1,61) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp² = .06. 
Achievement orientation. In addition, we examined the effect of our manipulation on 
participants’ self-perceived achievement orientation.  It was not significantly affected, t(62) = 
1.25, p = .21, d = .32, though the means were in the direction expected by prior ease of retrieval 
studies.  We then ran an ANCOVA analysis which examined the effect of the ease manipulation 
on goal striving while controlling for participants’ self-perceived achievement orientation (MSE 
= 2774.26).  Self-perceptions were a marginally significant predictor of goal striving, F(1, 61) = 
3.40, p = .07, ηp² = .05, and the ease manipulation still produced a significant effect, F(1, 61)  = 
5.66, p = .02, ηp² = .08.3 
Discussion 
We expected and found the achievement goal primed in this study to have a larger effect 
on motivated behavior when people associated the primes with the experience of ease (vs. 
difficulty). By using a variable known to influence confidence (Tormala et al., 2002), we 
obtained further evidence for the goal validation hypothesis.  This study addresses a number of 
shortcomings from Experiment 1.  First, because our dependent measure (post-failure effort 
expenditure) is uniquely associated with motivational striving, we were able to demonstrate that 
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validity cues do affect goal pursuit.  Second, the use of ease as our validity cue makes our results 
less susceptible to the alternative explanations raised earlier (i.e., that power is associated with 
approach).  Third, because the results are independent from changes in mood, we also rule out 
the alternative that participants in the ease condition persisted simply because they felt better.  
This finding is important because it suggests that our findings are independent from other goal 
priming research on the moderating role of affective states (i.e., goal value; see e.g., Custers & 
Aarts, 2005; Huntsinger, Sinclair, Dunn, & Clore, 2010). Finally, because the results are 
independent of conscious shifts in self-perceptions, we further add validity to the claim that we 
examined nonconscious goal pursuit.   
Critically, although ease of recall has been shown to produce confidence, we still must 
infer that confidence and doubt produced the observed results.  In order to address this limitation, 
Experiment 3 more directly manipulated this variable to demonstrate its critical role in 
moderating goal priming effects.  
Experiment 3 
Our first two studies offer initial support for the prediction that primes’ effects on 
subsequent motivated behavior can be moderated by validation processes. Although the 
manipulations used in these studies are established determinants of confidence and have been 
used extensively in other research, it remains possible that they may have manipulated constructs 
other than confidence. Consequently, in Experiment 3 we sought to more directly manipulate 
confidence.  Confidence is defined as the extent to which mental content is perceived as valid 
(Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995) and has been identified as the primary mediator of other 
validation effects, including the validating effects of power, ease, and other variables (e.g., see 
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Briñol, Petty, Valle, et al., 2007; Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 2007; Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002; 
Tormala et al., 2002).  
In this experiment, we primed participants with either a self-improvement or money 
saving goal immediately prior to having participants reflect on times when they felt confidence 
or doubt, and examined the impact of the primes on people’s intentions to donate to charity.  We 
expected those who articulated past instances of confidence to become more certain of the 
validity of the primed goal compared to those who reflected upon instances of doubt and thus 
become more likely to act on the goal.  Furthermore, this confidence in the validity of the 
accessible goal was predicted to lead to greater goal-congruent behavior among participants 
made to feel confident after priming.  The same primes should have no effect on those 
participants who are subsequently made to feel doubtful.  
Method 
Participants were primed with self-improvement or money saving goals and then induced 
to feel confident or doubtful.  Participants then read about three ostensible charities and indicated 
their interest in donating to each.  Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.   
Participants.  Participants were 93 undergraduates at Ohio State University who 
received partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement.  The experiment 
was a 2 (Goal Prime: self-improvement vs. saving money) X 2 (Confidence: high vs. low) 
between subjects design, with random assignment to condition.  
Materials  
Goal prime and confidence.  Parallel to Experiment 1, participants completed an 
ostensible pretest measure for the development of a life-events inventory.  This task served to 
manipulate both independent variables.  The goal prime instructions for the self-improvement 
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(saving money) were as follows: 
Different people choose to pursue different activities in order to improve themselves 
(save money). In this survey, we are interested to learn about the type of activities that 
you usually pursue in order to become a better person (save your money). Please list 
everything that you do in order to become a better person (save money). 
Participants were provided with up to 150-seconds to provide their responses.  These goals were 
selected because both are socially sanctioned motivations that can be viewed positively, but have 
opposite implications for our dependent variable, charity donation intentions. Because donating 
to charity can fulfill a goal to improve the self and be a better person, this should increase 
donation intentions. In contrast, a goal of saving one’s money should be negatively related to 
giving money to charity. Afterwards, participants completed the task a second time, but were 
instructed to write about a single time when they had felt either confident or doubtful (from Petty 
et al., 2002).  The instructions for this task were as follows: 
For this recall task we are interested in the type of events and the experiences people 
associate with doubt (confidence). To help us address this question we would like you to 
write about a time you felt doubt (confident).  Please write down, as specifically as you 
can, what that event was like that made you feel doubt (confident) and how you felt 
during that event. 
Charity donation intentions. Following the above inductions, participants viewed three 
brief print advertisements for charities that were created to “help children pursue their dreams.”  
For each charity, participants were asked, “If you had an opportunity to donate some money to 
this charity at the end of today's experiment, how much money would you donate based on the 
scale below?”  Participants responded on an 11-point scale labeled with monetary values ranging 
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from $0 to “more than $64.” The second scale point was $0.25, and from there each scale point 
doubled in value (to translate scale points to monetary values, the formula y = 2(x-4) was used), 
providing greater sensitivity at the low end of the distribution, congruent with the low income 
that is common in a college student sample.  Responses for each of the 3-charities were averaged 
(M = 6.85, corresponding to $7.21, α = .61).  Higher values on this index represent greater self-
improvement (and lower money saving) motivation.   
Results  
Participants responses for donating to the charities were submitted to a Goal Prime (self-
improvement vs. saving money) x Confidence (high vs. low) ANOVA.  For ease of 
interpretation, we report the monetary totals associated with participants’ responses.  The only 
significant effect was the predicted Prime x Confidence interaction, F(1,89) = 6.20, p = .02, ηp² = 
.064 (see Figure 2).  Decomposition of this interaction indicated that there was a main effect of 
the prime when people were made to feel confident, F(1,89) = 4.78, p = .03, ηp² = .050, such that 
people in the self-improvement condition (M = 7.70 ($13.00), SD  = 1.88, n = 23) were willing to 
donate significantly more money than people in the saving money condition (M = 6.40 ($5.28), 
SD = 2.17, n = 21).  In the doubt condition, no significant effect of prime emerged, F(1,89) = 
1.72, p = .19, ηp² = .017,. As in Experiment 1, there was hint of a reversal, as the saving money-
primed participants tended to donate more money (M = 7.00 ($8.00) SD = 1.94, n = 26) than self-
improvement primed participants (M = 6.26 ($4.79), SD = 1.88, n = 23).  
Discussion 
In line with the goal-validation perspective, participants made to feel confident behaved 
in a manner congruent with the primed goals while those made to feel doubtful did not.  
Critically, we obtained this effect by directly manipulating confidence.  By targeting this key 
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variable, we provide the strongest evidence to date that the validity associated with a prime can 
moderate the extent to which it causes goal adoption and pursuit.   
General Discussion 
Several recent theories of automatic behavior suggest that primed goal-related concepts 
are more likely to result in motivated behavior when perceived as valid (Loersch & Payne, 2011; 
Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009; Wheeler et al., 2007).  Here, we presented this general goal 
validation perspective and provided the first direct evidence for these theoretical arguments.  
Across three experiments, we demonstrated that manipulations affecting the validity of primed 
mental contents determined the extent of goal pursuit that followed priming.  Although past 
theory and research in this area has emphasized the relative inevitability of goal priming (Bargh, 
2006), we only found prime-congruent motivation under conditions that fostered thought 
confidence (versus doubt).  Completing manipulations known to produce doubt after priming 
eliminated these normal priming effects (and even tended to reverse them; see Experiments 1 and 
3).  This same moderation occurred whether confidence (versus doubt) was manipulated directly 
or through a sense of power or the ease of goal generation, and was evident using a range of 
different goals and priming methods.  The consistency of the findings across these divergent 
manipulations suggests that any variable that influences confidence or doubt (e.g., posture, self-
affirmation, emotions, for a review, see Briñol & Petty, 2009) has the potential to impact 
automatic goal pursuit under the right conditions. Thus, the current results add validity 
perceptions to the rather limited subset of previously identified variables that moderate goal 
priming effects.  These effects are uniquely predicted by the self-validation perspective, which 
focuses on confidence, rather than other moderators of goal pursuit such as the value (i.e., 
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valence) of the activated goal (e.g., Aarts, 2007; Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 2009; see also 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2007).  
Moderators of Goal Priming 
As noted earlier, relatively few variables have been shown to moderate the impact of goal 
priming on behavior.  To our knowledge, this list previously included only reactance motives 
(Chartrand et al., 2007) and the reward value of the activated goal (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005; 
Huntsinger et al., 2010).  On the surface, the current research might appear to overlap with 
research on the value of goals.  Notably, past research manipulated the pairing of goal-relevant 
constructs with valenced stimuli (e.g., Aarts et al., 2007; Custers & Aarts, 2005) or 
accompanying goal activation with general affective experiences (e.g., Huntsinger et al., 2010).  
Because confidence is generally perceived to be positive, it is possible that our studies 
manipulated both value and confidence.  Importantly, a number of past investigations using 
validity manipulations similar to our own have found that they had a significant impact on the 
confidence of consciously-generated thoughts while leaving the valence of those thoughts 
unaffected (Briñol, Petty, Valle et al., 2007; Petty et al., 2002; Tormala et al., 2002; Weick & 
Guinote, 2008).  This, in conjunction with the null effect on mood in Experiment 2, increases our 
confidence in the validity of our results and theoretical perspective. 
Conversely, it is also possible that past studies attempting to manipulate value have also 
manipulated confidence.  This seems less likely in studies that have manipulated evaluation of a 
goal in a very specific manner (i.e., pairing valenced stimuli with goal-relevant stimuli; Aarts et 
al., 2007; Custers & Aarts, 2005) or that measured the evaluation of the goal independent of goal 
activation (Custers & Aarts, 2007).  However, in studies which manipulated general affective 
states (e.g., Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Hunstinger et al., 2010), such alternatives are possible, 
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particularly since manipulations of affective states have been shown to influence confidence 
(e.g., Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 2007; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
Additionally, the hints of contrast under conditions which produce doubt (Studies 1 & 3) 
also lend credence to the goal-validation perspective.  Past studies examining affective variables 
have found that pairing goals with negative valence will only eliminate goal pursuit (Aarts et al., 
2007; Huntsinger et al., 2010), not cause people to pursue antithetical motives.  However, the 
validation perspective predicts that there are conditions when contrast from activated goals might 
occur (Briñol et al., 2010; Loersch & Payne, 2011).  Most notably, if doubt in an accessible 
thought is so great that a person desires to do the opposite of this thought or if a person’s 
behavioral options are perceived to be dichotomous instead of continuous (e.g., approach versus 
avoid instead), contrast can emerge.  To examine contrast in the current studies, we conducted a 
meta-analysis of Experiments 1 and 3 (Experiment 2 did not manipulate goal activation 
independent of validity).  We first standardized scores on the DVs prior to combining the files.  
We then submitted the DVs to a Goal Prime x Validity Condition X Study ANOVA (MSE = 
167.67).  The only significant effect to emerge was the Goal Prime x Validity Condition 
interaction, F(1, 177) = 13.91, p < .001, ηp² = .072.  Simple effects tests revealed significant 
assimilation under confidence-fostering conditions, F(1, 177) = 9.47, p = .002, ηp² = .048, and 
significant contrast under doubt-fostering conditions, F(1, 177) = 4.78, p = .03 , ηp² = .025.  This 
finding, combined with the research discussed above, suggests that goal validity, in addition to 
goal value, can be a critical consideration for predicting the final goal-directed behavior which 
emerges after exposure to a prime.   
Implications for Priming Mechanisms 
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Although the present studies focused on goals, the theoretical perspectives from which 
our predictions were derived are designed to apply to priming effects more broadly (Loersch & 
Payne, 2011; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009).  This is because these models posit that an activated 
construct can guide a range of different judgments and behaviors (see also Bargh, 2006), but that 
the precise effect of the prime is determined by a range of contextual features, such as which 
targets (e.g., oneself, another person) are most salient (e.g., DeMarree & Loersch, 2009; Kay et 
al., 2008; Smeesters et al., 2009).  Based on these models, primed concepts act as information 
that can help a person to figure out an appropriate judgment or response in a given situation.  In 
line with these models, we expect that the validity of activated mental contents should moderate 
the impact of a prime on judgment, behavior, and motivation, no matter whether the effect is 
mediated by the goals one pursues or some other mediator, such as perceptions of oneself, the 
situation, or another person (see also Note 2).  Thus, although the current paper focuses on goal 
pursuit, we believe that validity processes will moderate the impact of any type of prime across a 
wide range of judgments and behaviors (DeMarree, Briñol, & Petty, 2012; Loersch & Payne, 
2011; Wichman et al., 2010).   
In addition, it is worth noting that the validity perspective could account for some of the 
variability in effect sizes across priming studies.  Although we manipulated perceived validity in 
our studies, mental contents might be stored with some “default” degree of validity (e.g., Petty, 
Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007).  If mental contents are activated that a person perceives to be low in 
validity (e.g., negative stereotypes of African Americans among egalitarian individuals; Maddux, 
Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005), typical priming effects might not emerge.  In most cases, 
however, the “default” level of validity is likely to be high because mental contents are generally 
believed to be valid unless sufficient evidence invalidates them (see e.g., Gilbert, 1991; Petty et 
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al., 2007).  This is one possible reason why past research has not needed to take validation 
processes into consideration when attempting to demonstrate the efficacy of goal priming (e.g., 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh et al., 2001), and suggests that the current findings were likely 
driven by the low confidence conditions decreasing reliance on primed thoughts.  
Validation Effects 
The current findings also extend prior research on validation processes.  Research on 
these processes has focused primarily on relatively intentional responses to persuasive messages 
occurring in high thought situations (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Petty et al., 2002).  The current 
findings are consistent with the more general notion that validation processes occur commonly in 
social and nonsocial judgment.  Interestingly, whereas past research demonstrates that validation 
processes occur to the greatest extent under high thinking conditions (Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 
2007; Petty et al., 2002), the present findings suggest that an extension of the previously-
identified boundary conditions of validation processes might be warranted.  In past research, the 
thoughts which were validated or invalidated were in conscious awareness and were clearly 
related to the outcome (e.g., thoughts in response to an advertisement are clearly related to a 
person’s evaluation of the advertised product).  However, in the present studies (and particularly 
Experiment 1), the origin of participant’s prime-relevant thoughts and the connection of the 
thought activation to the outcome variable was less obvious (indeed, funnel debriefing 
procedures revealed that our participants did not see a connection between the priming tasks and 
dependent variables).  Future research should continue to extend research on validation processes 
to identify the critical boundary conditions of their operation. 
In addition to highlighting the role of validity in automatic goal pursuit, we should note 
that sources of validation can play multiple roles in guiding judgment and behavior.  Parallel to 
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Briñol and Petty’s (2009) analysis of persuasion, it is likely that the current paper’s validation 
mechanism is most likely to operate when the validating variable follows (rather than precedes) 
goal activation.  In other conditions, different effects are likely.  For example, when the 
confidence of the validating information (power, ease) precedes the activation of goals, it could 
bias the generation of goals and goal accessibility, consistent with emerging research on power 
(e.g., Guinote, 2007).  Future research on self-regulation can benefit from considering the timing 
of the key manipulations as placement of the independent variable in the sequence of goal-
related stimuli can have an impact on the mechanism by which it operates.  
Caveats and Future Directions 
As noted above, one of the primary contributions of the current research is that it greatly 
expands the list of known goal priming moderators. Across studies, we utilized a number of very 
different validity cues, demonstrating how they similarly influenced the effect of a goal priming 
manipulation on behavior.  Because any single validity cue may play a number of roles, one 
strength of the current approach is its ability to account for the similar effects of three apparently 
disparate manipulations (related by their common link to confidence).  Together, these findings 
add any variable which affects validity perceptions (e.g., self-affirmation, a person’s posture, for 
a review, see Briñol & Petty, 2009) to the other well-established moderating influences on goal 
pursuit such as positive and negative affect (Aarts et al., 2007; Custers & Aarts, 2005; 2007; 
Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Huntsinger et al., 2010) and high dispositional reactivity (Chartrand et 
al., 2007).   
Although the current findings established the moderating role of validity inductions in the 
translation of a prime into motivated behavior, the precise locus of this effect remains unknown. 
Past research suggests that there are two possible routes by which this influence could occur.  On 
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the one hand, one might suspect that validation processes alter the probability that the 
information made accessible by the primes is used to infer a motivational state (Loersch & 
Payne, 2011). In this case, the validity cue affects whether prime-related accessible content is 
perceived as a valid or invalid source of information, altering the probability of goal adoption 
itself.  On the other hand, an alternative possibility is that the primes do activate a goal that is 
adopted by participants in all conditions and that validation processes then affect the likelihood 
that this adopted goal is perceived as a valid guide to action (cf. Bargh, 2006).  Here, the validity 
cue affects the process of goal pursuit, but not goal adoption.  This differentiation essentially 
parallels the distinction attitudes researchers make between thought confidence (e.g., Briñol & 
Petty, 2009) and attitude confidence (e.g., Tormala & Rucker, 2007).  In each case, increased 
confidence is associated with the increased use of the associated mental content (e.g., in thoughts 
predicting attitudes or in attitudes predicting behavior).  As in the work on attitudes, it is likely 
that both processes can occur (see also Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009).    
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Figure 1: Money given to a partner as a function of goal prime and power conditions.  Positive 
values indicate more cooperative behavior.  Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 2: Intentions to donate to charities as a function of goal prime and confidence conditions.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence interval.  Values represent scale points (x).  To calculate 
dollar value of each scale point (y), use the following formula: y = 2(x-4). 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Separate analyses on the dictator and trust games revealed parallel effects (interaction Fs 2.88 
& 4.41, ps < .10 & < .05, respectively). Further, a Prime x Power x Game Type mixed ANOVA 
revealed the same effects as the main analysis, which were not moderated by game type, F(1, 88) 
< 1, ns.   
2 It is also possible that goals can be activated as a result of a change in perceptions of the self, 
the situation, or of people in the social situation (see Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009). 
3 We also ran an ANCOVA analysis in which both mood and rated achievement orientation were 
included as covariates (MSE = 2802.26).  The effect of condition remained significant, F(1, 60) =  
5.79, p = .02, ηp² = .09. 
 
